In the fall of 1956, just as the presidential election campaign was winding down, President Dwight Eisenhower was confronted with a crisis in the Middle East that Henry Kissinger has called the “Suez fiasco.” Although partial blame for the crisis rested with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the British and the French shared substantial blame in what the London Guardian called “a disaster."
The Suez Crisis helped to demonstrate that the two newly emerged superpowers – the United States and Soviet Russia – had eclipsed the old colonial powers. British failures during the crisis heightened the reality that imperial power was a thing of the past. At the same time, the United States was thrust into Middle East affairs, beginning the long struggle to balance Israel’s right to exist against Arab concerns.
John Foster Dulles and Egypt
Egypt had never been fully independent until Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser forged the modern state. Both Soviet Russia and the United States courted Nasser, offering foreign aid and support. In principle, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles agreed to help build the Aswan Dam, a major project designed to provide electric power as well as stem the flooding problems in Cairo.
Nasser, however, was no lackey of the United States. He purchased arms from Czechoslovakia, a Soviet satellite. Nasser recognized Communist China, led by Mao, over the exiled Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek that had taken refuge in Taiwan. Dulles, exasperated by these actions, withdrew United States’ support for the Aswan Dam. In retaliation, Nasser seized the Suez Canal, nationalizing it and depriving the British and French of the $25 million in annual revenues.
Britain, France, Israel, and the Role of Oil
Five years before the British and French ultimatum to Egypt, in tandem with an Israeli attack in the Sinai, Winston Churchill told the British Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden, “Tell them [Egypt] that if we have any more of their cheek we will set the Jews on them and drive them into the gutter, from which they should never have emerged.” His words may have been prophetic.
In October 1956, Sir Anthony Eden helped orchestrate the attack on Egypt. Although there had been weeks of diplomatic activity and United Nations response aimed at averting a military solution, it was the French who convinced Britain that the military option was the only viable course. The French knew that Israel was about to launch an attack in the Sinai. This would be the perfect pretext to dispatch troops, ostensibly to protect the canal.
In 1956, 64% of the world’s oil reserves were in the Middle East. The Suez Canal was the vital link between this oil and Europe. British companies controlled many of the refineries. After the debacle, oil would be rationed in Britain until May 1957.
Response of the United States
Neither Britain nor France informed the Eisenhower administration of their military actions. On the evening the news of the attack was broadcast, United States UN Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. attempted to meet with the British UN ambassador but was rebuffed. There would be no last minute diplomatic solution.
When the United States helped to craft resolutions aimed at sanctioning Britain, America’s strongest ally cast her first ever veto against the United States. An angry Eisenhower threatened action even as Russia's Nikita Khrushchev dangled Soviet rockets over the heads of Britain and France.
Writing in the Spectator, Peter Hoskin states that British aggression was “designed to circumvent the United Nations and to secure Britain again in full possession of the Canal.” Douglas Hurd, a former foreign secretary, claims that the Suez Crisis was “one of many landmarks” causing Britain’s imperial decline. Above all, the British world role was decisively replaced by the United States, and Eisenhower was well aware of this.
Sources:
- Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 (Penguin Books, 1997)
- “A Disaster,” Guardian editorial, November 1, 1956
- Peter Hoskin, “The Valley of Decision,” Spectator, November 2, 1956
- Douglas Hurd, “Half a Century On, the Ghosts of Suez,” Spectator, July 19, 2006
- Geoffrey Wheatcroft, “A Lesson Still Worth Learning,” Spectator, November 2, 2006
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